Why did Victorian Britain invest so much capital abroad? We collect over 500,000 monthly returns of British and foreign securities trading in London and the United States between 1866 and 1907. These heretofore-unknown data allow us to better quantify the historical benefits of international diversification and revisit the question of whether British Victorian investor bias starved new domestic industries of capital. We find no evidence of bias. A British investor who increased his investment in new British industry at the expense of foreign diversification would have been worse off. The addition of foreign assets significantly expanded the mean-variance frontier and resulted in utility gains equivalent to a meaningful increase in lifetime consumption.
Never before or since has one nation committed so much of its national income and savings to capital formation abroad. -Michael Edelstein 1
It is estimated that between 1865 and 1914 Great Britain invested more than £4.1 billion nominal pounds abroad.
2 For a nation that until 1850 had exported less than two percent of its gross domestic product, this was a prodigious sum that represented 5.4 percent of GDP. 3 At the same time that British capital was leaving the island at unprecedented levels, British industry began a decline that signaled the beginning of Britain's transformation from world's workshop to banker. While it was no surprise that a nation would eventually surpass Britain in industrial might, the speed of the reversal caused much consternation among the British elite. The city of London, with its perceived propensity to funnel capital overseas rather than into domestic industry, was widely suspected of hastening the decline of British industry. According to this view, London's capital markets systematically discriminated against domestic industry by ignoring potentially profitable domestic investments, preferring instead to invest in inferior projects overseas. Cottrell (1975, p. 27) and Stone (1999, p.6 ) both estimate £4.1B was raised on the London stock exchange. These estimates amount to a lower bound as total overseas investment includes the £4.1B raised on the LSE plus foreign direct investment and the purchase of foreign securities trading outside of London. 3 The pre 1850 overseas investment estimate is from Edelstein (1982, Crafts, et al, (1989) and Broadberry (1997) provide evidence that counters the conclusion of outright British industrial decline prior to the First World War. Since the Macmillian Report, the charge of foreign bias has resonated throughout the literature. Proponents of the view that British capital markets failed argued that domestic investors sent capital abroad due to bias or ignorance.
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There is strong evidence that it [the London capital market] was not perfect, that there was virtually total ignorance among financial institutions and advisors about investment opportunities in home industry, and that banks and other institutional lenders operated with traditional and irrational prejudices as to which type of investments they
should support and which they should not. -Pollard (1987, p.460) Proponents of rational markets responded with an appeal to revealed preferences.
British investors who sent capital abroad must have believed that this was the optimal use of their funds. To proponents of rational markets, this was strong evidence that the returns offered by the forgone domestic investments must have been inferior to their international counterparts.
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It is important to note that both sides of this debate framed their arguments in the context of which investment (domestic or foreign) had a higher expected return. The focus on return is appealing. If Victorian investors expected to earn higher returns overseas, this could explain capital flows abroad without having to resort to claims of bias. On the other hand, if British investors discriminated against domestic securities, the price of these securities would be lower (and their returns higher) than would otherwise be the case.
Given the focus on returns, one would think that the debate about capital market bias would have ended in 1982 when Michael Edelstein published Overseas Investment in 5 Rosenstein-Rodan (1967) Capital Movements and Economic Developement p.68. 6 For instance Crafts (1979) , Pollard (1985) and Kennedy (1974 Kennedy ( , 1987 . 7 For example, McCloskey (1970 McCloskey ( ,1979 , Temin (1987 Temin ( , 1989 , Michie (1988) Rourke and Williamson (1999, p.226) The implication that domestic rates of return must have exceeded those available on foreign investments is not the obvious implication of capital market bias. If British investors were biased against domestic assets this bias would manifest itself in a higher domestic rate of return then would otherwise be the case. Whether the effect of bias was sufficient to make domestic rates of return exceed foreign depends upon the magnitude of the bias and other factors that influence asset returns such as risk and diversification.
Comparing the magnitude of domestic and foreign returns is a valid test of capital market bias if, and only if, domestic returns have equal or lesser risk and investors are forced to choose between investing all of their savings either at home or abroad. When (1999) . 8 O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) provide an excellent summery of the debate. Pollard (1985) and Kennedy (1987 p.146-147) are prominent examples of critics who were unconvinced by Edelstein's work.
investors are given the opportunity to divide their money between home and foreign assets, the expected rate of return on domestic assets can exceed the expected rate of return on foreign assets and an unbiased, rational investor will still choose to invest a portion of her wealth overseas if the diversification benefits of foreign investment outweigh the loss of return.
In our opinion, diversification is a likely explanation for the high level of Victorian overseas investment. Foreign asset returns had a low correlation with domestic asset returns. Nineteenth century investors were certainly sophisticated enough to realize the benefits of international diversification. C.K. Hobson, writing in 1914, suggested that Victorian investors sent capital abroad due to their desire to "spread risks by investing in various countries or in diverse industries." 9 Turn of the century investment guides encouraged overseas investment as a form of insurance against domestic market declines. The second, and probably more important, reason that diversification has been ignored is the practical problem of a lack of data. Before we can hope to evaluate the diversification benefits of foreign investment we must be able to measure the covariance between domestic and foreign assets. Prior to our data, the available security returns were too sparse to apply the statistical tests and consumption comparisons we utilize. Michie (1988) Financial data tends to display a high rate of attrition, with many companies trading for a fraction of the entire time frame. The amount of entry and exit within our panel is heightened by bonds reaching maturity (few are perpetuities), and the substitution of new stock for old. The average life of an individual security within our data set is 9.8 years.
17
We sort securities by geographic region and industry and compute value-weighted indexes. Each asset is determined to be British, U.S., foreign, or British colonial/protectorate. 18 As markets thickened throughout 1866-1907, financial publications sorted securities into industrial categories such as foreign government bonds, foreign 15 The Records of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges is located at Harvard's Baker Library. 16 The London and U.S. Stock Exchanges were the most liquid exchanges during the Victorian Investment Boom. For excellent history of the size and efficiency of these exchanges see Michie (1988) . 17 With 4,059 securities spanning a 42 year period our dataset could be populated with over 2.2 million observations. A balanced panel of this sort is unlikely due to entry, exit, and the maturation of securities. A similar result can be found in modern data, as the population of CRSP data over the past 21 years yields 65 percent of the data missing. In addition, Little's (1988) MCAR test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the missing data within our sample is missing completely at random. 18 Information regarding whether a company was foreign or domestic was determined by the company name, e.g., "South African Breweries," or from various web-based resources, such as the UK National Archives, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk.
railroads, electric, gas companies, etc. We use this information to further divide the data into value-weighted indexes that reflect specific types of investment opportunities.
We employ these heretofore-unknown data to investigate the effects of international diversification on the portfolios of Victorian investors. This is the first study to use 19th century data that is both broad enough and sampled at a high enough frequency to apply the mean-variance spanning tests common in the modern portfolio choice literature. This is also the first study of Victorian investment to include assets trading on the exchanges of the United States as well as London. There is considerable evidence that
British investors held a large number of assets listed on the exchanges of the United
States.
19 By adding U.S. assets to the choice set, we hope to better reflect the true set of investment opportunities available to Victorian investors.
Test Portfolios
We sort assets into portfolios corresponding to type and geographic location. For the purpose of this study we define a company as foreign if it is located outside of the United Kingdom or if it exists to raise capital for overseas ventures. Thus in addition to companies located abroad we classify investment trusts and banks as foreign if they are headquartered in London but invest their capital abroad. Details of the portfolio compositions, and the average 28-day gross returns, standard deviations and correlation coefficients can be found in Tables 1-2. The ex-post returns and correlations provide prima facie evidence of the diversification benefit of international investing. The foreign government bond portfolio had both a high return and a low correlation with domestic assets. 20 Likewise, foreign corporate bonds had higher returns than their domestic counterparts with slightly higher risk.
The ex-post diversification benefits apparent in Tables 1 and 2 Temin (1987) and Kennedy (1987) have suggested that British investors had a "fear of equities" and preferred to invest in foreign government bonds. Ex-post, this seemed to be a wise decision as foreign government bonds simultaneously delivered high returns and diversification benefits.
differences are statistically significant, were the apparent benefits from international diversification meaningful enough to explain the Victorian penchant for overseas investments? To answer these questions we require a method to evaluate the meanvariance trade-offs available to 19th century British investors.
Evaluating the Benefits of International Investing
We utilize a method that encompasses both risk and return to evaluate the affect of the addition of foreign assets into the portfolios of British Victorian-era investors. We present three measures of the benefits of international diversification. The first is a straightforward statistical evaluation of the null hypothesis that the addition of foreign assets provided no diversification benefits. The second is an estimation of the wealth gain a British investor would demand before willingly refraining from international investment.
The third measure estimates the optimal weights on the global efficient portfolio and compares the estimated weights to actual market weights at the time. Together these three 
A graph of two mean-standard deviation frontiers formed by domestic and internationally diversified portfolios can be found in Figure 1 . A word of caution is in order. Ex-post estimates of the mean-variance frontier are formed by replacing μ and Σ with their sample estimates μ and Σ . Even if the ex-anti domestic portfolios were mean-variance efficient, an ex-post frontier constructed from the finite sample estimate μ and Σ will lie to the left of the domestic portfolios.
Did the addition of foreign securities actually expand the ex-ante mean-variance frontier or are the observed ex-post differences the result of sampling error? To answer this question we require a test of the likelihood that an observed expansion of the ex-post mean-variance frontier was the result of sampling error. If the addition of foreign assets actually expanded the mean-variance frontier of Victorian investors, we should be able to reject the hypothesis that the observed benefit is the result of sampling error.
A Spanning Test
Under what conditions would the inclusion of a foreign asset fail to expand the mean-variance set of potential investments? Huberman and Kandel (1987) show that the vector of L domestic assets, , t R span a foreign asset, ,
If (2) holds, one can replicate the expected return of the foreign asset with a portfolio of domestic assets. If this is the case, the foreign asset is redundant and its inclusion had no effect on the ex-ante mean-variance frontier. If t R does not span t r , however, then the inclusion of the foreign asset expands the mean-variance frontier. Thus one can test for spanning by estimating (2) via OLS and evaluating the joint restrictions on the coefficients.
A Spanning Test with Short Restrictions
The Huberman-Kandel spanning test may not be restrictive enough to capture the real-world constraints faced by Victorian investors. The spanning test in (2) does not rule out short positions. Although it was often easier to short stocks in the 19th century than it is today, for many investors short restrictions were a realistic constraint when choosing their optimal portfolios. 21 Therefore, whenever we reject the null hypothesis of spanning, we should ask if the apparent diversification benefits of international investing rely upon the ability to sell assets short and form highly leveraged portfolios. If the results depend upon short sales, we should question whether the apparent gains from diversification are consistent with the general equilibrium market clearing condition that all assets must be held.
DeRoon, Nijman, and Werkers (2001) show how to manipulate the minimization problem in (1) to derive a spanning test with short-sale constraints. Consider an investor who maximizes the following utility subject to a short sales constraint place all of her wealth in the portfolio with the highest expected return (the foreign laws were eventually rescinded. The first law attempting to curtail short sales was enacted in 1697, with further attempts made in 1720 , 1734 , 1746 , 1756 , and 1771 (Harrison, 2004 . 22 This utility specification provides a convenient illustration of the derivation of the short-sale constrained spanning test. The resulting test does not depend upon a specific utility function. 23 Markowitz (1991) and DeRoon, Nijman, and Werkers (2001) government bond portfolio). As we increase γ and re-solve (3), the optimal weights continue to consist of all wealth in the foreign government bond portfolio until the coefficient of risk aversion reaches 6.8.
An investor with 6.8 < γ < 10.5 prefers to forgo some expected return in favor of the diversification benefit from splitting her money between the foreign government bond portfolio and the British corporate bond portfolio. Recall the expected returns and standard deviations from 
We estimate (6) for each subset simultaneously via seemingly unrelated regression.
Let αˆ denote the 2P x 1 vector equal to the difference between the left and right hand side of (7). Under the null hypothesis that R t spans t r the test statistic in (8) is
Kodde and Palm (1986) show that under the null p is asymptotically distributed as a mixture of  2 distributions with p-value
where wN, i, Var   is a probability weight equal to the probability that N-i of the N elements of a vector distributed N0, Var   are strictly negative.
Measuring Utility Gains from International Diversification
The spanning tests above suffer from the well-known problem of statistical versus economic significance. The spanning tests ask a simple question: If domestic assets span
foreign assets, what is the probability of observing the given expansion in the ex-post mean-variance efficient frontier. Failure to reject the null of spanning suggests that foreign assets made British investors better-off but the tests offers no guidance as to the magnitude of these welfare gains. To give the shift in ex-post frontiers an economic interpretation we employ the methodology of Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Lewis (2000) , and Rowland and Tesar (2004) to measure the utility gain associated with a shift in the mean-variance frontier.
Following Lewis (2000), we evaluate the utility gain for an investor with a EpsteinZin-Weil expected utility
where γ and θ are the coefficients of risk aversion and inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution respectively. β is the 28-day discount rate which we set equal to .999 .
Both foreign and domestic asset returns are assumed to be jointly log normally distributed. Under these conditions, the expected utility of consumption for an investor who holds the optimal domestic portfolio is
where t W is wealth at time t and D μ and 2 D σ are the expected return and variance of the optimal portfolio comprised of domestic securities alone. Likewise, the expected utility of the investor who holds the optimal combination of foreign and domestic assets is
where DF μ and 2 DF σ are the expected return and variance of the optimal portfolio formed with domestic and foreign stocks.
Given the set of domestic and foreign assets, t R [ ] t r , the utility gain from diversification can be computed by choosing portfolio weights to maximizing (11)-(12).
The ratio of the optimal utility with all assets to the optimal utility when the investor is constrained to hold domestic assets alone forms our measure of the gains from 24 It is customary to use the Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function because this specification allow the riskaversion parameter, γ , to differ from the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, θ . 25 The utility is only defined if the discount rate is less then 1. This is equivalent to the restriction that The diversification benefit in (13) depends upon investors' risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Unfortunately there is no consensus about the true magnitude of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Therefore, we report values of Φ for a range of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution.
Testing Portfolio Weights
In addition to testing the ability of domestic assets to span foreign securities and measuring the utility gains provided by overseas investment, financial publications from the period allow us to test the optimality of investment allocations. Given the actual market weights from the period we use the Britten-Jones (1999) methodology to test their optimality.
Britten-Jones (1999) formulate a procedure to estimate optimal portfolio weights based on an linear regression of excess returns on the unit vector. Regression t and Fstatistics can be used to calculate confidence intervals and test for the optimality of observed Victorian-era portfolio weights. A common drawback to this procedure is extraordinary low power. Confidence intervals around the point estimates for the optimal weights are invariably large. Many papers using Britten-Jones methodology find optimal portfolio weight confidence intervals that are sufficiently wide that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that home bias is rational in modern data. 26 Although the spanning methodology of Huberman-Kandel (1987) provides a more powerful test of the null that the addition of foreign assets expand the mean-variance frontier the Britten-Jones methodology allows us to draw inference about individual asset allocations across industries and geography.
Results
26 Ahearne , Griever & Warnock (2004) . See Lewis (1999) for a review of the home bias literature.
We use each of the three methodologies outlined above to measure the gains from international diversification for a Victorian British investor. The gains are quantified through the spanning tests, utility gains, and weights tests using different means of separating asset classes. First, we sort the portfolios into six benchmark asset classes. The combination of portfolios that comprise the benchmark sets can be found in the first column of Table 3 . Each set represents a different level of international diversification or asset type. We then separate the asset classes further by categorizing stocks and bonds into separate industries. And finally, we attempt to test whether Victorian investors actually held "optimal" portfolios by aggregating our asset classes according to the market values of different security allocations found in historical financial publications. We can reject the hypothesis that British assets spanned foreign government bonds, foreign corporate stocks, and U.S. bond portfolios. We can not reject the hypothesis that British assets spanned the foreign corporate bonds or U.S. stock portfolios. Looking at the gains in utility from Table 4 , the addition of foreign securities resulted in utility gains of 10 to 89 percent when investors were able to take short positions and 8 to 33 percent when short sales were restricted. The magnitude of short-restricted gains available to Victorian investors was similar to estimates of the short-restricted utility gains available to modern U.S. investors.
Benchmarks 1 through 6:

27
With the exception of British Government bonds, foreign government bonds were the most popular investment among Victorian-era British investors. By 1883, foreign government bonds accounted for 23 percent of the par value of all securities trading on the London Stock Exchange. 28 When one considers the diversification benefits apparent from the high returns and low correlations in Tables 1 and 2 , the British appetite for foreign government bonds is easy to understand.
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Did Victorian investors need to diversify beyond foreign government bonds? The second set of assets, which we call Benchmark 2, consists of all the domestic portfolios contained in the first benchmark plus the foreign government bond portfolio. Tables 3 and   4 therefore contain the results of the spanning tests and the utility gains from international diversification beyond foreign government bonds.
If short sales were allowed, the inclusion of foreign corporate stock and US bonds expanded the mean-variance frontier while the inclusion of foreign corporate bonds and US stocks does not. On the other hand, a British investor who was constrained to long positions was able to expand their mean-variance frontier by adding foreign debt or equity.
This expansion was also economically significant, as the addition of foreign debt or equity to benchmark 2 allowed for consumption gains up to 40 percent, with utility gains much smaller for the short-restricted investor. While the diversification gains to a British investor appear measurably less than the benchmark 1 case, individuals already holding foreign sovereign debt and a domestic portfolio could diversify further through investing in private debt and equity abroad.
Was it possible to replicate the return of foreign government bonds with any other assets? Benchmark 3 includes every portfolio except the foreign government bond portfolio. A test of the hypothesis that the assets in Benchmark 3 span the remaining portfolio of foreign government bonds is therefore equivalent to a test of the hypothesis that foreign government bonds provided no diversification benefit to a Victorian investor who had already diversified across all other domestic and foreign assets.
The addition of foreign government bonds expanded the mean-variance frontier of Victorian investors only when inventors were restricted to long positions. This expansion, while statistically significant, offered very small utility gains of no more than 1 percent of 27 Lewis (2000) Tables 3 and 4 . For both sets of spanning tests, the results imply that an investor that held all bonds or all stocks, for both foreign and domestic assets, could claim diversification benefits by shifting a fraction of their portfolio into both debt and equity. The Victorian's fear of equities appears irrational until we take the utility gains into account, after which the Victorian preference for debt becomes clear. For investors holding a portfolio of bonds, the addition of equity investments negligibly affect the utility gain from diversification. On the other hand, adding debt to equity only portfolios resulted in utility gains of 10 to 120 percent when investors could short and 2 to 120 percent when investors were short restricted. In light of these consumption gains, Victorian investors' choice of debt rather than equity appears to reflect rational calculation rather than a "fear of equities."
So far, we have treated all foreign investments the same. However, Victorian investors had the opportunity to invest abroad without risking their capital in a land the empire the addition of non-empire securities had no effect on the mean and variance of their optimal portfolios.
The results again point towards the diversification benefits of foreign fixed-income securities. We only fail to reject the hypothesis of spanning in the case of non-empire stocks. Both foreign government bonds and non-empire bonds expanded the meanvariance frontiers of Victorian investors. The gains from investing outside the empire were considerable. These gains ranged from 11 to 84 and 6 to 36 percent of wealth depending on investors' preferences and ability to short assets.
Benchmarks 1 through 3 provide convincing evidence that British Victorian-era investors had to look abroad in order to maximize their mean-variance tradeoffs. The measurement of utility gains from diversification with Benchmarks 4 and 5 lends credence to the popular explanation that the high level of Victorian overseas investment was due to
British investors' preference of debt over equity, particularly foreign government and U.S. railroad bonds. 31 Benchmark 6 shows why Victorian investors choose to look outside the British Empire to find suitable investments.
Industry Spanning Tests and "New" British Industries
While the tests on the above benchmarks highlight the overall benefits of foreign investment, our data permit a more refined test of the theory that Britain's capital markets failed to sufficiently fund specific industry. In particular, we are able to value weight at the industry level to test whether investors in a particular industry could diversify further by investing in the foreign analog of that industry. Furthermore, industry-level data will allow us to test the argument that capital market failure was partially responsible for the decline of British industry. We create a set of value-weighted indexes of stocks and bonds from "new growth" industries that dominate trade and development in the 20 th century.
31 See Kennedy (1987) for a discussion of the Victorian's preference for foreign debt.
We then test for diversification benefits when investors held a portfolio comprised of "new growth" industries. Tables 5 and 6 contain the results of spanning tests and measures of utility gains for the industry and "new" industry indexes, respectively.
For the basic industry analysis, each stock or bond return is grouped according to the categories outlined in the Investors Monthly Manual. This approach, while useful for the delineation of securities within our dataset also follows the common industry-grouping characterization of the Victorian period.
32
The industries include railroads, finance, electric and petroleum, telephone and telegraph, miscellaneous, iron coal and steel, mines, and steamship and shipping. The spanning test evaluates if a British investor who held British government bonds and domestic securities from a single industry could expand their mean-variance frontier by investing in foreign securities from the same industry.
Overall, the spanning tests and the measures of the utility gains from diversification presented in Table 5 are consistent with our earlier findings. Outside of the electric and petroleum and the iron, coal, and steel industries, we reject that short restricted investors could span the foreign securities with the risk free asset and domestic holdings.
When short sales are allowed the rejection rate decreases, and the British investors meanvariance frontier was expanded with overseas investment in railroads, financial, telephone and telegraph, and the miscellaneous industries. In terms of utility gains, investors in particular British industries see the highest utility gains from holding foreign railroads, financial companies, and steamship and ship building industries. Together, these two sets of results provide additional evidence that there were significant gains to be had by investing outside of British industry, particularly when Victorian investors funneled their wealth into foreign railroads, financial companies, and steamship and shipping companies.
British investors gained significantly by holding broad value-weighted portfolios of foreign securities or foreign portfolios for a particular industry. It is argued that a capital market failure, caused by a lack of sufficient funding for the continued development of domestic industry, contributed to the relative decline of British industry. To test this we construct a set of domestic holdings of "new" industries, comprised of value-weighted portfolios of securities from developing industries. We define "new" industries as electricity, petroleum, telephone, telegraph, iron, coal, steel, and miscellaneous commercial and industrial companies. If the portfolios of new industries dominate foreign investment, either through spanning foreign securities or through foreign stocks and bonds providing little additional utility gain to investors, than the case can be made that financing was misappropriated. The tests in particular examine whether a mean-variance investor holding 5 value-weighted portfolios of "new" industries (electricity and petroleum, telephone and telegraph, iron, coal, and steel, miscellaneous commercial and industrial companies, and the risk-free asset) could expand his or her mean-variance frontier or increase their utility by investing in foreign government bonds, foreign corporate stocks, foreign corporate bonds, or US stocks or Bonds. The results of the "new" British industry spanning and utility gains tests can be found in Table 6 .
The tests in Table 6 provide evidence that even when British investors held a broad array of "new" industry securities the addition of foreign securities significantly expanded their risk return tradeoffs. Only when short sales were allowed did foreign corporate stocks and US stocks not significantly expand the mean-variance frontier; the addition of foreign bonds expanded the frontier even when short sales were allowed. Particularly large utility gains result from investing in foreign government bonds, foreign corporate bonds, and US bonds. Foreign corporate bonds offered up to 238 percent utility gain over our "new growth" industries, followed by the possibility of 130 percent gain with U.S. Bonds, and an 84 percent gain for foreign government bonds. A British investor who increased his funding of new industry at the expense of foreign diversification would have been worse off. Using Britten-Jones' (1999) methodology, we test whether the actual weights at a specific point in time are statistically different from the optimal weights. We calculate for the optimal portfolio weights of a mean-variance investor for three points in time: 1883, 1893, and for 1903. The optimal portfolio weights are estimated from returns over a 10-year interval centered on the dates for which Michie reports actual portfolio weights. We estimate the optimal weights for varying levels of risk aversion (γ). 34 Table 7 contains the true market weights and the results of Britten-Jones' hypothesis test that the true weights are statistically indistinguishable from the optimal weights. Table 7 re-affirms the low power common in tests of the optimality of a set of market weights. For 1883 and 1893, except for one case, regardless of the level of risk aversion or how much an optimal investor might short, we cannot reject that the optimal weights are statistically different from the market weights. Simple ocular econometrics would lead one to believe that the market weights for every year are very different from the estimated optimal weights. However, we can only reject the null hypothesis that the 1903 weights are equal to optimal weights. The rejection in 1903 results from the large deviations of the optimal weights from the market weights as mean-variance investors attempt to significantly short domestic bonds while simultaneously placing a large positive weight on financial stocks. Given the magnitude of the differences between actual and optimal weights, our failure to reject in 1883 and 1893 is almost surely due to the low power of the test methodology, and where the markets weights are rejected as sub-optimal, we learn very little.
Were the Holdings of British Investors
Conclusion
33 The miscellaneous categories in Michie mirror the miscellaneous commercial companies discussed earlier, but we can further aggregate these securities into three categories in order to closely fit the market weights from the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. The three miscellaneous categories are social infrastructure, commercial and industrial, and tea, coffee and raw materials. Social Infrastructure contains canals, docks, gas, electric, telegraph, telephone, tramways, omnibus, and waterworks companies. Commercial and Industrial contains commercial and industrial, breweries, distilleries, iron, coal, steel, and shipping companies. Tea, Coffee, and Raw Materials contains mines, nitrate, oil, tea, coffee, and rubber companies. 34 The results are robust to alternative interval lengths used to estimate the optimal weights. Although Michie reports market weights for 1873, which is included in our panel, we cannot test if those weights were optimal due to data limitations. The miscellaneous sectors were not reported separately in the Investors Monthly Manual until 1872.
Why did British investors send so much of their capital abroad? Because that's where the returns were. The benefits of overseas investments were not limited to competitive returns, however. The real benefit of international investing was the diversification benefit of holding foreign assets that had a low correlation with their domestic counterparts.
Proponents of the view that Victorian capital markets failed have argued that the high level of Victorian foreign investment and any evidence of domestic returns commensurate with foreign returns must be proof of bias. When one considers the low correlation between domestic and foreign investments, however, it becomes obvious that a proper test of market failure is far more stringent. Before we can deem Victorian investors irrational, we must not only show that domestic assets had commensurately high returns but also that it was possible to form a domestic portfolio with the low variance of an internationally diversified portfolio.
What about the claim that British investors and the British economy could have done better by investing at home? These counter-factual investments never occurred, so we cannot evaluate their benefits directly. Given the assets that did exist, we can reject the claim that British Victorian-era investors acted irrationally when purchasing foreign assets.
A British investor who increased his investment in new British industry at the expense of foreign diversification would have been worse off.
In light of the observed benefits of international diversification, it is no surprise that British Victorian-era investors' sent capital overseas. By sending a portion of their capital abroad, Victorian investors were able to increase their returns while simultaneously decreasing the risk of their portfolios. Victorians did not invest overseas due to bias or ignorance. Instead, the Victorians sent capital overseas in search of both the high returns and diversification that rational investors crave. 
Optimal Weights for gamma =
The following table presents the actual market weights, the optimal portfolio weights evaluated for a given level of risk aversion (γ), and the p-value for null hypothesis that the optimal weights are equal to the true market weights. 
